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 1403 
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: FIVE CLARIFYING 
QUESTIONS 
LARRY YACKLE∗ 
 Before I looked into the two fine books we are reviewing here,1 I would 
have said that arguments from federalism are typically fraudulent, neither more 
nor less than deliberate attempts to cloud the discussion of real issues. Now 
that I have read what Sotirios A. Barber and Michael S. Greve have written, I 
am largely confirmed in my prejudices. But my suspicions about federalism 
contentions have been shaken a bit – enough to ask some questions of 
Professor Greve, whose answers might persuade me that there is some good in 
this federalism business, after all. I doubt it, but I am educable. 
I begin by explaining my low opinion of federalism theories. None of this is 
original with me, of course. I offer it only to establish the burden of persuasion 
that, in my view, Professor Greve must carry. Next, I sketch what I take to be 
Greve’s argument for a “competitive” federalism. Then I put five questions 
about his book. I do not mean these questions to be antagonistic, though I 
confess they may sound that way. The point is to seek clarification – to get at 
what Greve is getting at. 
I. 
The suspicion that federalism arguments are duplicitous is familiar enough. 
When your adversary’s case begins to look attractive and your own 
comparatively weak, you naturally change the subject. We need not rest on the 
classic example, the South’s resistance to racial equality in the name of “states’ 
rights.” Current illustrations are not far to seek. Officials in Texas claim an 
offense to state sovereignty if the Justice Department dares to challenge state 
redistricting plans,2 and, as Professor Barber observes, critics of the Affordable 
Care Act have adopted the same position.3 Acknowledging that federalism talk 
can mask independent values is neither ad hominem nor cynical. We ought to 
be skeptical when the objection to a principle or policy is not that it is wrong in 
substance but that it is recognized or implemented at the wrong stratum of 
 
∗ Professor of Law and Basil Yanakakis Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University. I 
would like to thank William Kaleva for help with this Essay. 
1 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS (2013); MICHAEL S. GREVE, 
THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012). 
2 Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Suing in Texas Cases over Voting by Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2013, at A12. 
3 See BARBER, supra note 1, at 1. 
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government. If there is something worthwhile in federalism itself, it has to be 
detached from other ideas for which it is so often a proxy. 
There is another layer to the federalism-as-fraud point. When switching the 
conversation to “states’ rights” is insufficient, the next tactic is to deploy 
federalism as code for individual liberty.4 For reasons that passeth 
understanding, some people respond favorably to the states’ rights trope alone. 
Yet most would not bestir themselves greatly to preserve some sense of what 
the states do or are entitled to do in spite of a national consensus to the 
contrary. Comparatively speaking, threats to liberty get the juices flowing. One 
might think that tying federalism to liberty would be a stretch. Then again, it 
seems that willing minds in this country will view anything that hobbles 
government as a good thing inasmuch as, by hypothesis, somebody’s 
individual freedom is enhanced.5 
Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin have famously explained that 
federalism makes practical sense elsewhere in the world, where this peculiar 
governmental structure is necessary to maintain a single nation, many of whose 
citizens find their political identity in religion or language, which, in turn, takes 
root in particular geographic regions.6 When distinct congregate populations so 
hate each other, and so resist being governed together by the same central 
authority, the only way forward is spatial subunits with some measure of 
autonomy.7 Federalism is not an affirmatively desirable governmental 
structure, but a “painful expedient” when a nation can be viable in no other 
way.8 
Feeley and Rubin demonstrate that these conditions for federalism do not 
obtain in this country. True, there was a time when some Americans were 
willing to fight and die to keep other Americans in chains. But we had a Civil 
War about that, and, today, notwithstanding its celebrated diversities on so 
many levels, the United States “is in fact a heavily homogenized culture with 
 
4 E.g., Clarence Thomas, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, Why Federalism Matters, 
Remarks at Drake University Law School’s Dwight D. Opperman Lecture (Sept. 24, 1999), 
in 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 236 (2000) (contending that the independent sovereignty of the 
states allows them to protect liberty by restraining the national government); see Bond v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
5 Professor Moncrieff has identified a cousin of this phenomenon in the complaint that 
the Affordable Care Act requires individuals to purchase health insurance. In that instance, 
critics of the statute have judged that voters will not be moved sufficiently by the 
federalism-as-liberty connection and must be encouraged to see a threat to liberty in 
isolation. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation and the 
Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. L. REV. 639, 640 
(2012). 
6 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 68 (2008). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 60. 
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high levels of normative consensus.”9 Federalism retains some romantic 
purchase on our politics – which accounts for the value of injecting federalism 
arguments into debates over policy. But the virtues commonly associated with 
geographically defined, partially autonomous subdivisions amount to so many 
rationalizations; they could more easily be realized through sensible 
decentralization.10 The vices that inevitably accompany federalism need hardly 
be listed. We lack other nations’ reasons for living with them, and so we 
should not. If, then, this unified nation is rapidly developing a centralized 
structure (and it is), we should welcome the future as it takes shape around us. 
II. 
Professor Greve acknowledges the case that Feeley and Rubin offer and 
responds that the federalism he has in mind works only for a “single” 
populous.11 Federalism can defuse “identity-based differences” that, 
unchecked, would have disparate populations killing each other.12 But Greve 
insists that “one cannot understand American federalism unless one 
understands the Founders’ insistence that American federalism is not of that 
kind.”13 He proposes, then, an affirmative account of federalism in this 
country, an account that makes federalism something other than the necessary 
evil it is everywhere else.14 
Professor Greve devotes the lion’s share of his book to an attack on 
American federalism as it has come to be understood and practiced since the 
New Deal. This extant federalism is about the states as entities. In operation, 
by Greve’s account, it fosters the development of state “cartels,” which 
conspire with the national government to gouge the public.15 Greve argues, 
instead, that federalism is or should be about individual citizens (and 
businesses) and what they want, and should get, from a federal structure.16 The 
answer, he insists, is competition among the several states for the allegiance 
(and residence) of people and companies searching for the package of taxes, 
regulations, and services they find most attractive.17 According to Greve, this 
 
9 Id. at 118. 
10 Id. at 16. 
11 GREVE, supra note 1, at 6. 
12 Id. at 404 n.11. 
13 Id. 
14 I understand Greve to be concerned with the United States exclusively. Hence his 
extensive treatment of the U.S. Constitution. Since his argument is largely economic, 
however, he may think that it has, or would have, more general explanatory power. If so, he 
neither states nor elaborates that contention in this book. Cf. id. at 329-30 (suggesting that 
federalism in countries such as Argentina and Germany may be impervious to change). 
15 Id. at 4. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 6-7. Greve would acknowledge that he is not the first to argue that federalism is 
primarily about competition among the states. He begins his own discussion with “Tiebout 
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competitive federalism is revealed not only in modern economic analysis, but 
also in a host of historical writings about the Constitution, most prominently 
the Federalist.18 
This sketch grossly oversimplifies Professor Greve’s argument. At any rate 
there is much more detail in his massive book. If I can hope to contribute 
meaningfully to this Symposium, I should leave off any further attempt to 
summarize and move on to my questions. 
III. 
A.  
My first question is whether competitive federalism puts a structural face on 
what is at bottom a libertarian idea of acceptable government. I do not charge 
Professor Greve with hiding an ideological theory behind a federalism façade. 
He is forthright about his personal views and goes so far as to say that 
governmental life in the Gilded Age was about as good as it gets.19 Greve does 
not propose to revive the Old Court’s formalism for its own part.20 He 
advocates what he thinks is an objectively defensible account of federalism 
that, for him, happily comports with his own predilections. Still, I do wonder 
whether the libertarian spirit is not evident in the premises from which he 
works. 
Greve begins with an imaginary original position in which individuals 
choose the government they want before they know what place they will have 
in society.21 He readily acknowledges that, given a choice, most people would 
not select federalism in any form.22 Assuming, though, that only federalism is 
on the menu, the question is what kind of federalism individuals would 
 
competition,” and cites numerous entries in the fiscal federalism literature. Id. at 7 (citing 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)). 
18 Id. at 45-62. 
19 Id. at 5, 125. By contrast, Greve associates the federalism he thinks we actually have 
(and he condemns) with unsustainable individual entitlements that, in his view, are due for a 
“fiscal reckoning” with which conventional federalism is unequipped to deal. Id. at 382-83. 
20 According to Greve, the Justices who controlled the Supreme Court in the late 
nineteenth century did not mean to foster competition among the states, but nonetheless 
developed doctrines that promoted competitive federalism just the same. Id. at 173-74. 
21 Id. at 23. In this, he leans on the distinction between “precommitments” and “in-
period” positions developed by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. Id. (citing JAMES 
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962)). 
22 Id. at 45, 50 (acknowledging that Madison and Hamilton would have abolished the 
states if it had been politically possible). Greve concedes that any governmental structure 
that did not include the existing states was infeasible. Even if the men who drafted and 
ratified the Constitution had wanted to jettison the states (and some plainly did), they could 
not have done so. Id. at 5-6. 
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choose.23 Greve assumes that everyone would see clearly that safety comes 
first.24 It follows that all would accede to government a monopoly on physical 
force.25 Beyond that, everyone would agree that “some desirable goods” 
cannot be generated privately.26 Accordingly, “preconstitutional individuals” 
would consent that government should be empowered to “force” some 
exchanges.27 But only on two conditions – “acceptable decision costs” and 
“adequate safeguards” against “abuse.”28 Summarizing, Greve asserts, “the 
constitutional task is to craft rules that will permit Leviathan to command 
Pareto-efficient exchanges while limiting, so far as possible, forced exchanges 
beyond that point.”29 
In these passages, Greve appears to say that, ex ante, individuals would 
agree only to governmental distributions that are efficient in the classic Pareto 
sense that no one receives a benefit at the expense of another. This, of course, 
would entail minimalist government that would have troubled Herbert Spencer. 
Pareto efficiency may be a useful idea in economic analysis; at least, it 
supplies a label for a category of activity that economists may want to 
recognize. But few of us would elide Pareto efficiency with justice. An 
allocation in which one lucky participant has all the toys and his or her unlucky 
chum has none is Pareto-efficient. Any further distribution must take from the 
one and give to the other.30 
Relatedly (I think), Professor Greve has it that individuals behind the veil 
would choose competitive federalism, because it promises to “curb 
government surplus.”31 Others have observed that the idea of state “surplus” is 
both central to Greve’s thinking and surprisingly elusive.32 At times, Greve 
uses “surplus” in a noncontroversial way to describe the diversion of tax 
revenues from proper uses and into the pockets of politicians and their 
friends.33 On other occasions, he uses the same “surplus” term to mean 
exactions from out-of-state interests turned to the benefit of the resident 
 
23 Id. at 19. 
24 Id. at 37. 
25 In the case of a potential attack from the outside, as I understand him, Greve thinks 
that everyone would agree that the national government should have primary authority and 
responsibility. Id. at 37. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 59-60 (1971). 
31 GREVE, supra note 1, at 44. 
32 R. Shep Melnick, Book Review, 11 FORUM 77, 87 (2013) (reviewing GREVE, supra 
note 1); Jack M. Balkin, The Concept of “Surplus” in The Upside-Down Constitution, 
BALKINIZATION (June 17, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-concept-
of-surplus-in-upside-down.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D4LA-4NPL. 
33 GREVE, supra note 1, at 13. 
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population.34 This second form of “surplus” is connected to competitive 
federalism in that cross-border taxation and regulation undermines the ability 
of mobile individuals and companies to avoid unfavorable treatment by 
migrating to more sympathetic jurisdictions.35 Yet it is often difficult to tell 
whether government impositions fall, or are meant to fall, on outsiders. What 
appear to be extraterritorial taxes and regulation bleed into the run of 
governmental actions affecting local interests – actions that do not undercut the 
ability of individuals and companies to “vote with their feet,”36 but rather 
establish the basis for choices about where to locate.37 Better said, perhaps, in 
this age there really is no helpful distinction between out-of-state and in-state 
activities. 
In still other instances, Professor Greve has it that government accumulates 
“surplus” whenever it taxes or regulates in a way that serves the interests of 
political favorites.38 This last kind of “surplus” is the stock and trade of 
ordinary politics.39 To label political deal-making as exacting “surplus” is to 
condemn virtually anything government does. It is hard to credit lumping so 
many governmental activities together under the roof of “surplus” – everything 
from padding official expense accounts to building a public school that 
educators, parents, and taxpayers enthusiastically support, along with the 
contractors who lobbied for it and stand to make money on the job.40 Greve 
appears to recognize where his account of “surplus” leads – namely to the 
denunciation of governmental action of any kind short of supplying police and 
fire protection and the occasional lighthouse. 
Which brings us back to my question. If competitive federalism is a good 
idea because it largely limits government to Pareto-efficient distributions, and 
because it eliminates or reduces state “surplus” defined to cover most taxation 
and regulation, is competitive federalism the main event at all? Could 
Professor Greve just as easily, more easily, argue that the best state is a 
nightwatchman state without getting into intergovernmental structure?41 The 
response cannot be that competitive federalism is the instrument by which 
 
34 Id. at 7. 
35 Melnick, supra note 32, at 88. 
36 GREVE, supra note 1, at 7. 
37 Id. at 89. 
38 GREVE, supra note 1, at 100-01. 
39 Melnick, supra note 32, at 89 (discussing the problems of characterizing “surplus” as 
“naked interest group transfers”); Balkin, supra note 32 (characterizing this form of surplus 
as “constituent surplus”). 
40 See Balkin, supra note 32. 
41 When Greve addresses tax policy deeper into the book, he claims that the Constitution 
contemplates a “minimalist system,” which “holds out the prospect of robust tax 
competition, both vertically (where states and the federal government compete for the same 
tax base) and horizontally among states (where factor mobility limits the states’ 
appropriable surplus).” GREVE, supra note 1, at 81. 
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good government, that is, minimal government, is achieved. We would first 
have to agree that minimal government is something we ought to organize 
government for. We do not. 
B. 
My second question is whether competitive federalism owes much to the 
document we customarily call the Constitution, its text and its history (as best 
we can discover it). Professor Greve explains at the outset that the point of his 
book is to elucidate “the Constitution’s competitive structure and logic.”42 Yet 
he disclaims public-meaning originalism and its “narrowly textual, clause-
bound exegesis” as “problematic and incomplete.”43 He contends that the 
“principles and premises” that make sense of the Constitution “cannot be found 
in” the document, but rather in “antecedent” ideas the Constitution does not 
establish but presupposes.44 
I do not understand Greve to be saying the obvious – that neither the term 
“federalism” nor any explicit articulation of federal structure appears in the 
text of the 1789 document and that, accordingly, federalism of any ilk can at 
most be an inference from the text. He makes that point, to be sure.45 But he 
means something far more important – namely, that a particular kind of 
federalism, the competitive kind, is analytically prior to the text. Greve derives 
competitive federalism independently as the form of federalism that 
“preconstitutional” individuals would choose for themselves.46 
Then again, Professor Greve contends that the “calculus” of the Constitution 
“conforms elegantly” to the competitive federalism model.47 This, as I 
understand it, is a move familiar in legal academic circles. Greve does not 
propose to milk an idea from the text. He identifies an “economic federalism 
theory” and “brings [it] to bear on the text.”48 He purports to arrive at the 
correct account of the text by introducing independent ideas that make sense of 
it. I hasten to clarify that Greve eschews any Dworkinan attempt to make of the 
Constitution the best it can be.49 Rather, he presents competition as an essential 
“constitutional principle and ‘tacit postulate’” that gets the Constitution right,50 
 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 Id. at 14. 
44 Id. at 2, 14. 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 Id. at 19. 
47 Id. at 44. 
48 Id. at 63 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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that is, an idea that genuinely explains the Constitution’s “architecture”51 and 
“logic.”52 
I have no objection to losing the notoriously flawed notion that 
constitutional reasoning is an exercise in grammar. The Supreme Court itself 
drops that pretense in many of its most important and controversial decisions.53 
Nor do I protest references to external values as part of a pragmatic effort to 
make peace with the text, which may be all that Greve proposes to do.54 Again, 
most of us do the same thing all the time. Whether Greve is right that 
competitive federalism can fill this bill is, of course, something else again. The 
form his argument takes is noncontroversial; its strength is a matter of 
judgment for the rest of us. 
Professor Greve also, and again explicitly, disclaims any purpose to recover 
the intentions of the men who drew up the documentary Constitution and 
ratified it into law. He acknowledges that competitive federalism was “never 
explicitly articulated by the Founders,” and, indeed, states flatly that his book 
introduces “insights and empirical experiences that were not within the 
Founders’ specific contemplation.”55 He cautions against “[projecting] 
modern-day economic and public choice theories . . . backwards” to historical 
individuals who plainly had nothing of the sort in mind.56 So far, so good. 
Intentionalism is no longer respectable even among die-hard originalists – for 
the many reasons laid out in an extensive literature.57 
On this front, however, I wonder whether Greve does not stray from a sound 
beginning as he goes along. In fairly short order, he insists that the “Founders” 
did “perceive[]” the competitive features of federalism, albeit “imperfectly,” 
and he ascribes to them insights going beyond their conscious understanding at 
the time.58 He claims that Federalist 10 offered an “ingenious theory” 
consistent with competitive federalism, despite Madison’s personal objection 
to federalism of any kind.59 Indeed, he spends a great deal of time and space 
locating competitive federalism in the Federalist generally.60 I do not think 
Greve means that “the Founders” stumbled over competitive federalism in the 
 
51 Id. at 58. 
52 Id. 
53 Greve cites the cases on state sovereign immunity as clear examples. Id. at 312-13. But 
all the decisions having to do with constitutional structure, that is, the decisions in which 
Greve is most interested, rest at most on values the Court ascribes to the Constitution 
without specific textual warrant. 
54 Id. at 390. 
55 Id. at 16, 56, 63. 
56 Id. at 7. 
57 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE 
BASIC QUESTIONS 81 (2007). 
58 GREVE, supra note 1, at 17. 
59 Id. at 39. 
60 E.g., id. at 47-49. 
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dark and made it the foundation of the Constitution by accident.61 Even as he 
insists they were not thinking about this kind of federalism, he wants still to 
credit them with some undeveloped insight that they were adopting a 
constitutional structure that depends deeply on competition among member 
states. 
Throughout the book, as Greve strives to bring competitive federalism to 
bear on the Constitution, he rests on what he thinks “the Founders” were about. 
So, for example, when he distinguishes divided societies in which federalism is 
an acceptable expedient, he relies on “the Founders’ insistence” that American 
federalism, properly understood, is different – meaning the good kind of 
federalism he calls competitive.62 And in his critique of developments since the 
New Deal, he argues that the federalism we in fact observe is a federalism “we 
were never meant to have.”63 These statements are jarring next to Greve’s 
admission that the men he calls “the Founders” lacked a firm commitment to 
federalism of any stripe.64 
Perhaps I am making too much of the occasional turn of phrase. Given 
Greve’s explicit disclaimers, it is hard to think that he does, after all, propose 
to retrieve and rest on original intentions.65 It is vitally important, though, to 
get this straight. We need to know if Greve contends that we are bound to 
embrace competitive federalism whether we like it or not, because “the 
Founders” thought it was a good idea and only their intentions count. 
I rather think that Professor Greve means only to fortify his own argument 
for competitive federalism by associating it with rough ideas held by strong-
minded men a long time ago. He links his argument to the historical 
Constitution and its “Founders” only in the weak sense that competitive 
federalism, independently arrived at, can be reconciled with at least some of 
what was written and perhaps thought in 1789.66 This, again, is common fare 
in legal academics, and I would be the last person to say the form of this 
argument is objectionable. Then again, if this is the way Greve ties competitive 
federalism to the documentary Constitution and its history, we are back to the 
previous point. If Greve contends that we should now impose competitive 
 
61 But see Ilya Somin, Turning Federalism Right-Side up, 82 CONST. COMMENT. 303, 321 
(2012) (reviewing GREVE, supra note 1) (suggesting that “the Founders were organizing a 
regime of competitive federalism without knowing it”). 
62 GREVE, supra note 1, at 404 n.11 (emphasis added). 
63 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 56. The Supreme Court notoriously tries to have intentionalist originalism both 
ways. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), for example, the Court conceded that there is 
no evidence that anyone in Philadelphia or at the ratifying conventions proposed that the 
Constitution would immunize states from suit in their own courts, but still insisted that the 
expectation that the Constitution would accord states immunity can be inferred from silence. 
Id. at 741. 
65 GREVE, supra note 1, at 14. 
66 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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federalism on the Constitution, he needs a convincing case that we should 
think this is a good idea in the here and now. And if his reason is that 
competitive federalism generates Social Darwinism, he will not have many 
adherents. 
C. 
My third question is whether competitive federalism comports with 
democracy. On one level, of course, it plainly does not, cannot, and need not. 
Anything that exists by virtue of a judicially enforced Constitution is, to that 
extent, antidemocratic in the obvious sense that a higher law that trumps 
majoritarian choices necessarily must be. Professor Greve, however, seems 
affirmatively to celebrate overrides of democratic choices. One might say, 
indeed, that democracy is the villain of his piece. 
In the abstract, Greve allows that democracy is the “safest form of 
government.”67 I take this to mean not that democracy is genuinely good, but 
rather (with Churchill) that democracy is actually bad, only better than the 
alternatives. In the next breath, Greve decries democratic government as 
“dangerous” inasmuch as it enables “rapacious majorit[ies].”68 The “constant 
challenge” to the competitive federalism he champions is “populist passion,”69 
which, in his view, entails “interest group politics.”70 
The federalism we actually have, in Greve’s view to our misfortune, has 
come in response to “democratic demands.”71 This “cartel” federalism 
emerged with the New Deal, which itself was the product of an “unusually 
high political consensus” during the Great Depression.72 Back then, according 
to Greve, the idea was to achieve a “more ‘democratic’ Constitution.”73 The 
federalism that followed was “more open to the demands of distributional 
coalitions and progressive social movements.”74 The result, in Greve’s telling, 
has been “opportunistic interest group bargains”75 congealing in social policies 
having a “very social-democratic feel.”76 
Greve thinks that, “ideally,” the rules for our structural arrangements should 
be “self-enforcing.”77 But competitive federalism is not a machine that would 
 
67 GREVE, supra note 1, at 38. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 42. 
70 Id. at 37. 
71 Id. at 178. 
72 Id. at 9. 
73 Id. at 181. 
74 Id. at 329. 
75 Id. at 327. 
76 Id. at 36. According to Greve, it is unrealistic to think we might retrieve a “pre-New 
Deal Constitution” despite “democratic imperatives.” Id. at 386. 
77 Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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go of itself. Given their head, Congress and the states will not preserve state 
competition, but will, instead, cooperate with each other, thus to produce 
“surplus.”78 Greve explains, then, that “[i]f competitive federalism is your cup 
of tea, . . . you’ll want to entrust the federal structure principally to the 
courts”79 – specifically “a federal judiciary armed to the teeth with 
procompetitive federalism provisions”80 like the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Joinder Clause.81 It is in the enforcement of those provisions, 
along with similar safeguards for competition fashioned judicially (like 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence) that the Supreme Court fulfills its 
essential function to prevent the agents of government from discarding the 
constitutionally ordained competitive structure.82 This, Greve contends, “is our 
Founders’ constitutional arrangement.”83 
In the event, Professor Greve argues that the Court has contrived to get its 
role backward. Ever since Carolene Products,84 the Court has chosen to protect 
individual constitutional rights and statutory “entitlements” created by 
Congress and the states in response to democratic urges.85 His illustrations are 
Roe v. Wade86 and various federal social welfare and education programs, 
including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicare, and Medicaid.87 
So far from a “rights” Court, however, Greve contends that the Constitution 
demands a “structure” Court – one that enforces competition among the states 
and leaves individual rights to “competitive politics” within the states.88 
This is startling stuff. One would have thought – certainly I would have 
thought – that the Carolene Products model is precisely right. Decisions made 
by electorally accountable bodies are presumptively valid, and any judicial 
trump must be justified by the necessity of protecting the democratic process 
or individual rights from self-satisfied temporary majorities. Structural matters 
can and should be left to develop as they will. Indeed, we should expect 
 
78 Id. at 7. 
79 Id. at 11. 
80 Id. at 78-79. 
81 Id. at 69; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
82 GREVE, supra note 1, at 197; see id. at 111, 202 (acknowledging that the dormant 
Commerce Clause lacks textual foundation). Greve contends that Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 
Pet.) 1 (1842), permitted corporations to use general law to thwart the accumulation of 
surplus. GREVE, supra note 1, at 222. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
favors the plaintiff’s choice of state law and in that way prevents corporations from escaping 
exploitation by repairing to the federal courts and more favorable general law. GREVE, supra 
note 1, at 222. 
83 GREVE, supra note 1, at 11. 
84 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
85 GREVE, supra note 1, at 267. 
86 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
87 GREVE, supra note 1, at 267, 274-75 (discussing Roe v. Wade and federal programs). 
88 Id. at 267-71. 
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change in those quarters as the political world itself matures. One has to be 
skeptical, then, about a structural idea that can be perpetuated only by main 
force exerted by life-tenured judges. 
Again, we are back to basics. Professor Greve promotes competitive 
federalism as “the Founders’ constitutional arrangement,”89 albeit he denies 
that “the Founders” actually thought things out in this way.90 If he contends 
that, even so, competitive federalism is a constitutional mandate imposed upon 
us by the men who wrote and ratified the 1789 document, then his case for 
judicial enforcement in the teeth of democratic sentiment is intelligible.91 
Intelligible, but scarcely persuasive. Most of us reject intentionalist originalism 
out of hand. And if we bought into it at all, we would doubt the case for 
originalist competitive federalism. 
If, on the other hand, Greve does not propose that we are bound to embrace 
competitive federalism on originalist grounds, then his argument for judicial 
enforcement must rest on the premise that competition makes sense of the 
Constitution, whatever the men responsible for it thought they were doing. 
That claim, however, can be convincing only if we agree that there is great 
value in competition among the states. Professor Greve thinks there is great 
value in competition, but that may be only because he likes the results he 
thinks enforcing competition will produce – namely, minimalist government at 
all levels.92 I do wonder, again, whether this book is not in the end a lengthy 
apologia for libertarian philosophy. If so, include me out. 
D. 
My next question is the extent to which competitive federalism recognizes 
and perhaps promotes personal choices along noneconomic lines. As I read his 
book, Professor Greve primarily argues that the mobility of capital and labor 
encourages states to compete with one another for value-generating 
commercial enterprise.93 Put the other way, companies are, or at least should 
be, free to shift from jurisdiction to jurisdiction looking for the most 
advantageous tax and regulatory environment for their businesses. Yet Greve 
does not limit the reasons for relocating to the desire to make a buck, and I do 
not understand him to be indifferent to individuals (and groups of individuals) 
moving about in search of something else, something more personal. He says, 
for example, that competitive federalism would “give states greater latitude in 
regulating their own citizens’ mores.”94 
 
89 Id. at 11. 
90 Id. at 16. 
91 Id. at 78. 
92 Id. at 5. 
93 Id. at 6. 
94 Id. at 309. 
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In a previous book, Greve was explicit that “the advantages of citizen choice 
extend not only to economic matters but also, and with equal force, to social or 
lifestyle issues.”95 He explained: 
Some people do not wish to live near homosexual enclaves or in 
jurisdictions that permit same-sex marriages; others like a tolerant, 
bohemian environment. Some people (including some smokers) feel good 
about themselves when banning smoking in public places; to others 
(including some nonsmokers), such restrictions smack of creeping 
fascism. Federalism permits the various constituencies to sort themselves 
and go their separate ways.96 
It may be that similar language appears in this new (big) book, and I have 
overlooked it. Or perhaps this book merely emphasizes economic incentives. 
At all events, I do wonder whether Greve is still committed to the idea that the 
Constitution contemplates individual choices about where to live writ large.97 I 
think so. 
The idea that the states are to compete on noneconomic grounds is helpful to 
Greve in one sense. It blunts the charge that competition for commercial 
businesses systematically benefits states that tax and regulate least. Greve 
thinks concerns about a “race to the bottom” are overdrawn.98 However that 
may be in the case of competition for economic activity, one might say that 
introducing competition for individuals making decisions on other grounds 
renders Greve’s case easier. Corporations focused on their profit margin may 
not care about personal and social affairs, but individuals do. And some at least 
are mobile enough to act accordingly. 
Competition for individuals pursuing ideologically comfortable 
surroundings also responds to the suspicion that competitive federalism is 
another name for minimalist government. According to Professor Greve, the 
states should largely be allowed to regulate their own citizens as they please. 
But, of course, citizens who object are free to depart, taking their productivity 
with them.99 The market for citizens disciplines the states, discouraging 
liberty-crushing regulation that drives too many residents to the exits, but also, 
and this is the point, encouraging regulation that brings enough new shoppers 
 
95 MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 4 
(1999). 
96 Id. 
97 I should distinguish the familiar understanding that an individual’s entitlement to 
change his or her state residency is not only grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
readily inferable from the Constitution’s structure in the elementary sense that we have but 
one nation. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
98 GREVE, supra note 1, at 186-88. 
99 Id. at 7. 
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in the door.100 Individual choice is a sorting mechanism, and everything comes 
out in the wash. 
If I understand correctly, Greve does not propose or predict that even perfect 
state competition for individuals pursuing ideological ends would resolve itself 
in some middle ground. It is not as though the states would all gravitate toward 
the same mix of social policies, which, in turn, attracts the maximum number 
of residents. This is the way political campaigns often work, but it is not what 
Greve has in mind. Just as Greve disputes the “race to the bottom” thesis with 
respect to competition for corporations, he would (I think) equally resist the 
notion that competition for individuals will drive state regulation of personal 
affairs to the lowest common denominator. Instead, he contends that 
competition of this kind would produce and preserve a menu of opportunities 
from which individuals can choose.101 
State competition for residents making selections according to criteria like 
these is unrealistic. The argument is too abstract. In my view, we have too 
many states. We would need many, many more to make competition on this 
scale feasible. And individuals would have to be far more mobile than they 
actually are and, into the bargain, would have to be willing to participate in a 
massive and never-ending game of musical chairs, always searching for a seat 
that promises a marginally better approximation of personal ideals. 
If we credit that some people would actually behave as Greve anticipates, 
the implications are not pretty. Individuals end up locating where they 
anticipate they themselves will not be pushed around, but where other people 
will be. In Professor Greve’s earlier book, he suggested that state competition 
benefits what Grover Norquist calls the “Leave-Us-Alone coalition,” which 
Greve describes as “a conglomeration of . . . gun owners, school choice and 
home schooling groups, the term limits movement, property rights groups, 
religious advocacy and lay organizations, tax limitation groups, small business 
owners, and so on.”102 Greve explains that these individuals and groups, 
organized around ideas, are not uniformly libertarian.103 Many are not 
demanding to be let alone at all; they are demanding that government impose 
burdens on others. So, for example, individuals and groups may want 
government to impose sectarian doctrine on the state’s population in the form 
of limits on abortion or same-sex marriage, or they may want government to 
tax the public to finance their parochial schools. I understand Greve to contend 
that the states should be free to compete for residents on bases such as these. 
To that extent, his competitive federalism is not libertarian philosophy by 
another name. Far, very far, from it. 
Professor Greve is clear that state competition of this kind is a two-way 
street. If I were making my own selection – bear with me a moment – I would 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 6. 
102 GREVE, supra note 95, at 23. 
103 Id. 
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live where women can choose whether to bear children and where people can 
marry anyone they love. While I am at it, I would find a place where SUVs, 
smartphones, and leaf blowers are banned; where the wine shops are forbidden 
to stock anything but cheap Australian reds; and where all watercraft must be 
made of wood. Oh, and where no one would be allowed to possess a handgun, 
but everyone would be obligated to have a King Charles spaniel. 
Greve would leave individual constitutional rights to the states without any 
meaningful, reassuring discipline. We conventionally do let states fashion a 
wide variety of policies, subject only to the check that democracy provides. 
But we do not, and should not, let states have their way with more personal 
liberties the Constitution now protects. I have to live with noisy leaf blowers, 
unless and until I can muster political support for a ban. But where choices 
about child bearing and marriage are denied, individuals cannot simply be told 
that’s the way we do things around here and, if you do not like it, take a hike. 
If I have him right, Greve relies on politics in precisely the wrong place – 
that is, where personal individual liberty requires protection from the majority. 
With respect to ordinary economic and social welfare matters, however, he 
discourages political participation and, instead, applauds poor sports who shirk 
the responsibilities of self-government and simply pick up their marbles and 
decamp. In his America, individuals exist in self-imposed bailiwicks of 
bigotry, surrounded by companions who may as well be clones, isolated from 
anyone who thinks differently. Greve’s America has no center at all, far less a 
center that can hold. It is a nation of detached units. And it has no heart. 
E. 
My last question is whether competitive federalism supplies any answers to 
the dysfunctions in the national government with which this Symposium is 
concerned. Professor Greve contends for a brand of federalism that he thinks 
benefits individuals and companies. He resists the federalism we actually have 
in major part for centering on the states as entities. I wonder, though, whether 
Greve’s focus on the horizontal relations among the states does not neglect the 
role the states play as units in the makeup and operations of the national 
government. If, for purposes of argument, we accepted that competitive 
federalism promises the good results Greve identifies, might we still conclude 
that those benefits are outweighed by the damage federalism does elsewhere in 
the system? 
Take the easiest example. As matters are now arranged constitutionally, 
each state has two seats in the United States Senate. Consequently, sparsely 
populated states to the west and south of here exert disproportionate political 
power. Or, if you like, the resident majorities in those states have a greater 
capacity to affect the Senate’s behavior than do majorities in eastern states 
with large urban populations. At times, including this time, this undemocratic 
structural design makes it difficult for the Senate as a whole to perform even 
routine functions (like giving advice and consent regarding appointments). 
  
1418 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1403 
 
I dare say that some proponents of federalism do not view this state of 
affairs with alarm: The states are supposed to check the national government 
(thus to safeguard individual liberty), and this is only a graphic illustration of 
the ways they do so. But I do not understand Professor Greve to take that 
position. By his account, “the Founders” did not conceive that the states could 
or would defend liberty against national governmental power104 and so 
withheld from the states any means of resisting “federal aggression.”105 If I am 
right about this, then, for Greve, the outsized power of small-population 
western and southern states in the Senate should be an invitation to demand 
abusive rents – the very thing competitive federalism was meant to forestall. I 
do wonder, accordingly, whether Professor Greve would form common cause 
with commentators who fault current arrangements for the states’ participation 
in the national government. 
 
104 GREVE, supra note 1, at 52. 
105 Id. at 54. 
